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Criminal Procedure
By MATTHEW J. F~rrz*
INTRODUCTION
The topics considered by the Kentucky appellate courts in
the general area of criminal procedure during the survey year'
were many and varied. Four such topics have been chosen for
in-depth consideration in this article. 2 The first involves inter-
* J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky. Mr. Fritz was assisted on matters of sub-
stance by William H. Fortune, Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
I July 1, 1977 through June 30, 1978.
2 In addition to the topics discussed in the text, several other developments de-
serve mention. Two Kentucky criminal procedure cases reached the Supreme Court
of the United States. In Taylor v. Kentucky, 98 S.Ct. 1930 (1978), the Court reversed
a conviction of second degree robbery. It held that under the peculiar circumstances
of the case, the state trial court's failure to give a requested instruction on the pre-
sumption of innocence resulted in a violation of defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at
1937. In response, the Kentucky Supreme Court amended Rule 9.56 of the Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter cited as RCr] to require an instruction on
the presumption of innocence in every case. See RCr 9.56 (as amended, effective July
1, 1978).
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), was a federal habeas corpus action
brought by a Kentucky state prisoner. Hayes had been indicted for uttering a forged
instrument under Ky. REV. STAT. § 434.130 (repealed 1975) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]. In the course of plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a
sentence of five years in prison for the offense, which carried a possible sentence of two
to ten years, in exchange for a guilty plea. In addition, Hayes was told that if he did
not plead guilty, the prosecution would seek an indictment under the Habitual Crimi-
nal Act, a charge justified by the facts, which in his case would mean a mandatory
life sentence, KRS § 431.190 (repealed 1975). He chose not to plead guilty and was
indicted again and convicted of both offenses. The Supreme Court held "that the
course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case, which no more than openly
presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing
charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 365.
In Powell v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1977), the Court reversed a
manslaughter conviction. The trial court not only had denied the defense the right to
question a witness concerning a suicidal disposition on the part of the decedent (due
to a possible conflict with a stipulation made by the parties), but also refused to allow
making of an avowal as to what the witness's testimony would have been. The Court
commented:
RCr 9.52 permits the introduction of an avowal in order that it can be
determined on appeal whether the proffered testimony should have been
admitted and, if so, whether its exclusion was prejudicial. The right thus to
preserve a claim of error is essential to the right of appeal. If a party is
forbidden the opportunity of making an avowal he is to that extent deprived
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of the remedy of appeal, to which he is entitled as a matter of right. Ordinar-
ily a motion for new trial is not a timely method of preserving testimony that
has been improperly excluded, but when the aggrieved party has been denied
the opportunity of making an avowal it is about the only way in which he
can get it in the record. Even, however, had there been no affidavit showing
what the witness would have said, or if the affidavit had been controverted,
still it would be necessary to treat the trial court's refusal to permit the
avowal as a prejudicial error, because the testimony of the witness himself,
under oath and subject to examination and cross-examination, is the only
sure indication of what would have been said in the presence of the jury.
Id. at 390. See also Eilers v. Eilers, 412 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1967).
In Yocum v. Burnette Tractor Co., Inc., 566 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1978), the Court
affirmed a decision of the Court of Appeals, 555 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) which
had held that
[in the absence of any showing that the business. . . is inherently danger-
ous . ..or . ..was subject to Federal or state regulation and/or license,
such as guns, liquor and drugs, or pervasively regulated or an industry with
a long history of regulation, a search and inspection of the closed areas of
the premises [pursuant to the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health
Act, KRS Ch. 338] . ..will not be permitted without a search warrant or
court order, either of which must be based upon a showing of probable cause.
Id. at 825. The Court went on to hold that:
the probable cause requirement may be satisfied by demonstrating that the
place to be inspected is of the general type due for inspection under statutory
or administrative standards setting up categories of places subject to inspec-
tion and bearing a rational connection to the goal sought to be achieved by
the Kentucky Occupational Health and Safety Act. [It] specifically
reject[ed] the Respondent's contention that a showing of 'reasonable
ground of suspicion of violation' in the particular premises is required before
probable cause to inspect is deemed satisfied.
566 S.W.2d at 758.
Substantially the same conclusion was reached by the United States Supreme
Court on the same day, with regard to inspections by the federal Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 1816 (1978). Both
Courts relied heavily on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See 98 S.
Ct. at 1820-27; 566 S.W.2d at 757-58. Both Courts based their decisions on the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 98 S. Ct. at 1819-20; 566 S.W.2d
at 757-58. In addition, both the Kentucky Supreme Court and Court of Appeals deci-
sions were based on § 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. See 566 S.W.2d at 757-58; 555
S.W.2d at 824. Although no Kentucky cases were cited as authority, the decision that
§ 10 requires a warrant in this case appears to be supported by Sullivan v. Brawner,
36 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Ky. 1931) (opinion of the Court by Thomas, J.), and Mansback
Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 30 S.W.2d 968, 971-73 (Ky. 1930) (Thomas, C.J.,
dissenting).
Finally, after several years of unheeded warnings to the bench and bar, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court moved decisively to eliminate the problems inherent in most
cases of joint representation of criminal co-defendants by adopting RCr 8.30. The first
version, adopted October 14, 1977, completely forbade joint representation in a crimi-
nal proceeding. Two months later, however, before its effective date, it was totally
* scrapped in favor of a more complicated yet fairer rule. The new version in effect leaves
the decision regarding joint counsel to the defendants. It provides safeguards, includ-
ing advice of the trial judge and counsel, and a requirement of a written waiver should
the defendants desire joint representation. By providing basically that "no attorney
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
esting questions of jurisdiction and post-conviction relief in
cases in which juvenile felony offenders had been convicted in
circuit court. The second part explores cases of prosecutor mis-
conduct and the judicial reaction to it. Part three examines
developments in the area of presentence procedures. The
fourth part discusses changes in the rules relating to attach-
ment of jeopardy in a jury trial.
I. CHALLENGING JUVENILE FELONY CONVICTIONS
A. Introduction
KRS § 208.020(1) states, in part: "The juvenile session of
the district court of each county shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion in proceedings concerning. . . any person who at the time
of committing a public offense was under the age of eighteen
(18) years . . . ."s Under certain conditions, when the crime
involved is a felony, the juvenile court may order a transfer of
jurisdiction of the case to the circuit court.4 The consequences
shall be permitted at any stage of the proceedings to act as counsel" for co-defendants,
it retains the advantageous portion of the prior version. By excepting those cases in
which the defendant, with full knowledge of the possibility of a conflict of interest,
waives separate counsel, it of course avoids the problems inherent in the first version.
Under the old case law, a defendant could successfully challenge his conviction
only by showing that there had been an actual conflict of interest at trial which had
actually prejudiced him. Compare Maynard v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 143 (Ky.
1974) with Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1974). See also Self v.
Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1977); Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174
(Ky. 1976); Napier v. Commonwealth, 515 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1974); Campbell,
Kentucky Law Survey - Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 701, 703-04 (1975). The
advantage of the new rule to indigent defendants is obvious. That it is designed with
them in mind is implied by the fact that it applies to the same class of cases to which
the rule providing assignment of counsel applies. See RCr 8.04; RCr 8.30(1).
KRS § 208.020(1) (Supp. 1978). Prior to creation of the district courts, exclusive
jurisdiction over juveniles was vested in the juvenile session of the county court. Robin-
son v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Ky. 1949). For convenience, subsequent references
to either court will be to the "juvenile court."
The cases in which such transfer is permissible and the procedures to be followed
in effecting such a transfer are set out in KRS § 208.170 (1977). See also Mayes v.
Commonwealth, 563 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1978); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.2d 727
(Ky. 1977); Hubbs v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1974); Risner v. Common-
wealth, 508 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1974); Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W..2d 592 (Ky.
1972). Since these procedures have already been the subject of extensive writing else-
where details will be set out only where necessary. See T. FITZGERALD, 8 KENTUCKY
PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 417 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 8
KENTUCKY PRACTICE]; Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court, 62 Ky. L.J.
1978-791
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of a failure to carry out proper transfer proceedings were exam-
ined in two cases during the survey year,5 and will be further
explored in this article.
B. The Recent Cases
Rich v. Commonwealth' and Schooley v. Commonwealth
7
both involved appeals from denials of motions under Ken-
tucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 challenging con-
victions.' Rich was decided in a memorandum opinion, per
curiam, and was not published Schooley, on the other hand,
was a lengthy and far-reaching published opinion.
1. Rich v. Commonwealth
Rich v. Commonwealth"0 was decided by the Kentucky
Supreme Court on July 1, 1977. The appellant had been con-
victed in 1958, at age seventeen, of murder. In 1974 he was
convicted of manslaughter and, on the basis of the 1974 and
1958 convictions, was also convicted of being a habitual crimi-
nal. A life sentence was imposed and the conviction was af-
firmed by the then Court of Appeals." Rich then instituted a
122 (1973); Comment, Transfer of Jurisdiction Under the New Kentucky Juvenile
Court Act, 4 No. Ky. L. REV. 141 (1977).
1 Rich v. Commonwealth, No. SC-79-MR (Ky. July 1, 1977) (mem. per curiam);
Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
6 No. SC-79-MR (Ky. July 1, 1977) (mem. per curiam).
7 556 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
3 For a summary discussion of post-adjudicative proceedings under this rule, see
8 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 4, §§ 936 - 940. Prior to Rich, "there ha[d] never
been a successful challenge [to a conviction in this type of case] by a motion under
RCr 11.42." Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d at 915. Challenges had been
allowed, however, in almost every other conceivable procedural posture. The opinion
in Schooley mentioned these: a "direct appeal from a judgment based upon a jury
verdict," see Richardson v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977) and Hubbs v.
Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1974); a "direct appeal from a judgment entered
upon a guilty plea," see Bingham v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1977); and
"a subsequent prosecution for being a habitual criminal," see Hamilton v. Common-
wealth, 534 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1976). 556 S.W.2d at 915. See also Robinson v. Kieren,
216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949) (successful challenge to circuit court conviction in a habeas
corpus proceeding).
9 For this reason, it may not be cited as precedent in briefs or opinions in other
cases. Ky. R.Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c) [hereinafter cited as CR].
,0 No. SC-79-MR (Ky. July 1, 1977) (mei. per curiam).
" Rich v. Commonwealth, No. 74-1134 (Ky. May 23, 1975) (mem. per curiam).
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post-conviction proceeding under RCr 11.42, arguing that his
1958 murder conviction was void, "as it was obtained in the
total absence of any hearing or proper proceeding in juvenile
court at which jurisdiction over him and the offense was
waived."'" His motion was denied by the circuit court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying
Rich's RCr 11.42 motion. The Court found that "[i]n the in-
stant case, there is no waiver order in the record, and there are
strong indications that no hearing was in fact held.' 3 The
Court also found that the motion was timely. It acknowledged
that "[iut is true that appellant's attack upon the validity of
his 1958 conviction and its use to enhance the penalty for his
1974 conviction and sentence to life imprisonment are raised
for the first time in this postconviction proceeding."" It also
recognized that prior cases of the United States Supreme
Court 5 and the Kentucky Court" had "held that a challenge
to a prior conviction must be raised in the recidivist proceeding
or it cannot be raised in a postconviction proceeding."17 Those
cases, however, involving claims of denial of, or ineffective as-
sistance of, counsel were distinguished by the Court. The Court
found that "the problem presented in this appeal requires a
different disposition, as the alleged infirmity of the 1958 con-
2 Rich v. Commonwealth, No. SC-79-MR, slip op. at 2 (Ky. July 1, 1977) (mem.
per curiam). In support of his "RCr 11.42 motion was a letter from the Barren County
Judge which stated that a search of the county court records did not reveal any juvenile
court proceedings whatsoever against appellant." Id.
11 Id. at 3. On this point, quoting from Ingram v. Wingo, 320 F.Supp. 1032, 1033
(E.D. Ky. 1971), the Court stated that" 'a recidivist conviction can only be obtained
if it is shown that the defendant had been previously lawfully convicted of a felony.'"
Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 4. It then continued: "This language indicates, and
this court must require, that the prosecution prove the validity of prior convictions(s)
[sic] used in habitual criminal prosecutions." Id. at 4-5. Under the facts presented,
however, Rich was not entitled to a new trial at this point, for "there is a presumption
of regularity of judgments indicating prior convictions and .. .the burden [is] on
the appellant to show that the prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained." Id.
at 5, citing McHenry v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. Ct. 1972), and Ingram
v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 815 (Ky. 1968). See Phillips v. Commonwealth, 559
S.W.2d 724 (Ky. 1977); Bell v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. App. 1978).
" Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 3.
" Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1947).
, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Ky. 1968) cert. denied, 397
U.S. 956 (1970). Copeland v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1967).
17 Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 3.
1978-79]
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viction is that it was obtained without the proper transfer of
jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the circuit court.""
While the Court hinted that it considered Rich's attack on
his conviction a "pure jurisdictional objection,"" it is clear that
the main theme of the Court's analysis was due process. Since
a prior valid conviction was essential to Rich's 1974 habitual
criminal conviction,"0 unless his 1958 conviction was valid, i.e.,
was obtained in compliance with the proper procedural safe-
guards, he was not guilty of the habitual criminal charge.21
Therefore, the Court vacated the order denying Rich's RCr
11.42 motion and remanded the case to the circuit court for a
hearing on the merits of the motion.22 It ruled that:
appellant is entitled to a full hearing on the questions of his
status as a juvenile at the time of his trial in 1958; whether a
transfer hearing was held, and if so, the nature and extent of
such a hearing; and, whether these facts were established at
his trial in 1958 ....
If, on remand, "appellant sustains his burden"2 of showing
that his 1958 conviction was unconstitutionally obtained, he is
entitled to a new trial. "Failing such a showing, the judgment
should be reinstated.
' ' 2s
18 Id. at 3-4 (emphasis by the Court).
11Id. The Court quoted from Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70,74 (Ky.
1971): "It is true that pure jurisdictional objections may be presented for the first time
on appeal . . . . But, only true jurisdictional attacks are thus permitted."
2 Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 4-5; KRS § 431.190 (repealed 1975). See
KRS § 532.080 (Supp. 1978).
21 See notes 67-73 and accompanying text infra where the Court's analysis is
further examined.
" Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 5.
"23Id.
24 Id. See note 13 supra and cases cited therein for an explanation of this burden
of proof.
" Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 5. Compare Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403
S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1966), in which the facts were strikingly similar to those in Rich. Rich
"argued that a 1974 judgment, which imposed a life sentence upon him as a habitual
criminal, was based on an invalid 1958 conviction which was obtained without the
proper waiver of jurisdiction from juvenile court." Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at
1-2. Unlike Rich, the movant in Wilson was "currently confined under a sentence...
as an habitual criminal. . . imposed incident to a 1964 conviction. . . for storehouse
breaking," and sought to have a 1933 conviction which was, in part, the basis for his
habitual criminal conviction, set aside under RCr 11.42, due to irregularities in juvenile
court proceedings which had preceded that conviction. 403 S.W.2d at 711. The Court
held that "RCr 11.42 is a procedural remedy designed to give a convicted prisoner a
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2. Schooley v. Commonwealth
The second case, Schooley v. Commonwealth,"6 was de-
cided by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals, just one
week after the Supreme Court had issued its opinion in Rich.
Schooley was sixteen years old when charged with seven counts
of breaking and entering. Following a hearing, the juvenile
court ordered his case transferred to the circuit court. He was
subsequently indicted, entered a plea of guilty to two charges
and was sentenced; he did not appeal. More than three years
later, he filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to vacate. Two and
one-half years after the first RCr 11.42 motion, a second such
motion was filed on his behalf by counsel. This motion was also
denied by the circuit court, which held that the 1968 transfer
of jurisdiction from juvenile court to circuit court had been
valid?
On appeal, the circuit court's denial of the second RCr
11.42 motion was affirmed. The court clearly treated the basic
issue in the case as one of due process, rather than jurisdiction,
and held that Schooley was foreclosed from challenging the
validity of the transfer order because of his failure to appeal the
denial of his first RCr 11.42 motion.2
C. Characterizing the Error
The drafters of the Second Restatement of Judgments have
noted that:
[t]here is a strong tendency in procedural law to treat var-
ious kinds of serious procedural errors as defects in subject
matter jurisdiction. This is because characterizing a court's
departure in exercising authority as 'jurisdictional' permits
an objection to the departure to be taken belatedly ....
direct right to attack the conviction under which he is being held."Id. at 712 (emphasis
added). Since Wilson was "not in custody by virtue of the 1933. . .conviction," id.,
the judgment denying his RCr 11.42 motion was affirmed. See RCr 11.42(1).
2 556 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (Martin, C.J.; Gant and Park, JJ.). The
opinion was authored by Judge Park.
" 556 S.W.2d at 914.
2Id. at 918. Procedurally, the case was identical to Crick v. Commonwealth, 550
S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1977). It appears that the Schooley affirmance could have been based
on a mere citation to Crick.
1978-79]
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This, in turn, permits a serious blunder to be remedied de-
spite tardy objection."
One area in which the Kentucky courts have treated procedural
errors as jurisdictional has been in cases involving the transfer
of juvenile felony offenders from juvenile court to circuit
court." As early as 1930, the Court stated that "[ilt has been
held in a number of cases that circuit courts have no jurisdic-
tion to try juvenile offenders, unless the. . . judge of the juve-
nile court. . . has first acquired jurisdiction and transferred
or surrendered that jurisdiction to the circuit court."' In most
of the cases, the question was raised on direct appeal."2 In one,
however, a prisoner who alleged that his conviction was void
due to shortcomings in the juvenile court proceedings was suc-
cessful in challenging his conviction in a habeas corpus ac-
tion.s
This approach has been the subject of both scholarly 3' and
judicial 5 criticism. In Schooley, the court gave lengthy consid-
2' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978). See, e.g., Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961); Talbott v.
Commonwealth, 179 S.W.621, 622-33 (Ky. 1915), which allowed the issue to be raised
for the first time on appeal. This result may have been possible without the use of the
"jurisdiction" characterization. RCr 9.26 CR 61.02.
3 See, e.g., Bingham v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1977); Hamil-
ton v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Ky. 1976); Risner v. Commonwealth, 508
S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1974); Hopson v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Ky.
1973); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky. 1971); Koonce v. Common-
wealth, 452 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ky. 1970); Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311,
312-13 (Ky. 1961); Robinson v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Ky. 1949); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 176 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1943); Ashley v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 614,
615 (Ky. 1930); Clark v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 398, 400 (Ky. 1923). See also
Heustis v. Sanders, 320 S.W.2d 602, 605- 06 (Ky. 1959).
' Ashley v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Ky. 1930).
32 See, e.g., Richardson v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977); Bingham
v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1977); Hubbs v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d
664 (Ky. 1974); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1943); Mauk v.
Commonwealth, 104 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1937); Grise v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.2d 362
(Ky. 1932); Ashley v. Commonwealtli, 33 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1930); Clark v. Common-
wealth, 256 S.W. 398 (Ky. 1923); Compton v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W. 36 (Ky. 1922);
Waters v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 490 (Ky. 1916).
33 Robinson v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949) (reversing circuit court's denial
of prisoner's petition).
. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDMENTs, ch. 2 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978).
33 Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d at 915-18. See also Anderson v. Com-
monwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70, 74-75 (Ky. 1971).
1978-79] KENTUCKY LAW SURvEY
eration to the term "jurisdiction. 38 In short, its conclusion was
similar to that found in a comment to the Second Restatement
of Judgments: "Manifest defects in subject matter jurisdiction
can be distinguished from matters concerning the merits and
procedure."' In this vein, the court noted that:
the rule that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be born of
waiver, consent or estoppelP has to do with those cases only
where the court has not been given any power to do anything
at all in such a case, as where a tribunal vested with civil
competence attempts to convict a citizen of a crime.3'
Obviously this was not such a case, because "[c]ircuit courts
have general jurisdiction to try felony cases, including charges
of storehouse breaking.""0 Thus, no matter what defects occur
in the transfer proceedings, or perhaps even in the total ab-
sence of such proceedings, the question of validity of the circuit
court actions "is one of policy, rather than power. The policy
consideration is one of due process.""1 In other words, the short-
coming involves "mere error," not subject matter jurisdic-
tion."
In any event, even if the error is characterized as one of
3 556 S.W.2d at 915, quoting from Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631-32 (Ky.
1970), which in turn had quoted from Commonwealth v. Berryman, 363 S.W.2d 525,
526 (Ky. 1962) and In Re Estate of Rougeron, 217 N.E.2d 639, 643 (N.Y.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 899 (1966).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978).
3See, e.g., Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. Berryman, 363 S.W.2d 525, 526
(Ky. 1962).
', 556 S.W.2d at 915, quoting In Re Estate of Rougeron, 217 N.E. 2d at 643
(footnote added) (emphasis added).
" 556 S.W.2d at 915. Therefore, even though, as pointed out by Robinson v.
Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Ky. 1949), "[u]nder [KRS §§ 208.020 (1977) and
208.170 (Supp. 1978)] the [district] court when sitting in juvenile session is [a court
of exclusive and original jurisdiction], and the circuit court is regarded as one of
limited or secondary jurisdiction," the circuit "court was not without some power to
adjudicate and its fault was no greater than that of error which remains uncorrected
until the appeal was finally resolved in the State's highest court." Nuernberger v.
State, 359 N.E.2d 412, 416, (N.Y. 1976). The New York court had earlier noted that
"discerning analysis would reveal that the absence of power of adjudication in a partic-
ular cause does not, in and of itself, automatically deprive a court's acts and proceed-
ings of their validity." Id. at 415.
" 556 S.W.2d at 916.
'= REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978).
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jurisdiction, it is no longer certain that the challenge could be
raised at any time. In this respect, the Second Restatement of
Judgments has changed the focus of the First Restatement:4
It was formerly the rule that the court's subject matter juris-
diction could still be challenged in a subsequent attack on the
judgment. The underlying proposition was that a judgment
of a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is a legal
nullity. The modem rule is that such a post-judgment attack
on the court's subject matter jurisdiction may be made only
in the impelling circumstances that justify lifting the rule of
preclusion."
Such a rule is consistent with that taken by the Kentucky
Court in recent cases.
4 5
13See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTS §§ 14, 15 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 7, 10 (1942).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 2, at 4 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978).
As expressed in the first Restatement, the concept of validity of a judg-
ment can be described as follows:
1. When certain requirements have been met concerning notice, terri-
torial jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction, a judgment is valid.
2. If those requirements are not met, the judgment is a legal nullity for
all purposes.
3. If those requirements have been met the judgment is unimpeacha-
bly effective (under the rules stated in Chapters 3 and 4), except that relief
may be obtained from its effects through equitable remedies (under the rules
stated in Chapter 5 of the first Restatement).
The approach taken in the present formulation can be described as
follows:
1. A court may properly render judgment only when certain require-
ments have been met concerning notice, territorial jurisdiction, and subject
matter jurisdiction.
2. If those requirements have not been met, the judgment may be
subject to avoidance and hence being treated as a legal nullity, depending
on the nature of the defect concerning the particular requirement, the oppor-
tunity that the complaining party has to challenge the defect, and whether
there has been reliance on the judgment since its rendition.
3. If the requirements have been met, the judgment is effective to the
extent and with the qualifications accorded a valid judgment (under the
rules stated in Chapters 3 and 4), except that relief may be obtained from
its effects, or at least some of them, through various procedures whose appro-
priateness depends on the circumstances under which relief is sought (under
the rules stated in Chapter 5).
Id. at 4 - 5.
" See, e.g., Crick v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1977); Holt v. Com-
monwealth, 525 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1975), discussed at note 58 infra.
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Responding to Kent v. United States," the Kentucky
Court had begun, in Smith v. Commonwealth,47 to examine
cases of juvenile waivers to circuit court in terms of due process
rather than jurisdiction." Before long, however, the Court
began once more" either to characterize the problem as one of
jurisdiction," use both characterizations interchangeably, 51 or
not use either." Consequently the area was filled with confu-
sion before Schooley. Judge Park's opinion in Schooley con-
tains a careful analysis of the concept of subject matter juris-
diction and the consequences of characterizing an error as one
of "jurisdiction."
If a transfer order is invalid on its face and a subsequent
circuit court judgment is 'void' because of lack of
'jurisdiction,' it would seem that the issue could not be
waived, but could be raised at any time. On the other hand,
if the issue is considered as a question of due process there
can be a waiver under certain circumstances by failure to
appeal.53
D. Due Process Treatment of Juvenile Transfer Cases
Schooley makes it clear that a circuit court has jurisdiction
of criminal charges against a juvenile d~spite defects in the
" 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 873 (1967).
" See Holt v. Commonwealth, 525 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Ky. 1975); Fields v. Common-
wealth, 498 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Ky. 1973); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70,
74-75 (Ky. 1971).
,1 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra, in which some of the pre -Kent
cases are discussed.
, See e.g., Bingham v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1977); Hamilton
v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Ky. 1976); Risner v. Commonwealth, 508
S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1974); Hopson v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Ky.
1973); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70,72 (Ky. 1971); Koonce v. Common-
wealth, 452 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ky. 1970).
St See e.g., Richardson v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977); Whitaker
v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Ky. 1972).
"1 See e.g., Crick v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1977); Hubbs v. Com-
monwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1974); Baker v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 69 (Ky.
1973).
0 Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d at 916-17. See Singleton v. Common-
wealth, 208 S.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Ky. 1948); Ritchie v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.2d 738,
739 (Ky. 1929). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENT §§ 14, 15 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1978) discussed in notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text supra.
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transfer from the juvenile court. As the Court of Appeals of
New York has remarked:
It is an encyclopedia commonplace that "[w]here a
court is without jurisdiction in the particular case, its acts
and proceedings can be of no force or validity, and are a mere
nullity and void" (21 C.J.S. Courts § 116). However decep-
tively attractive and convenient, this commonplace is both
too simple and too broad. Definitions of "jurisdiction" are too
varied and the consequences flowing from defective
"jurisdiction" too diverse."
While Kentucky courts have long relied on the commonplace
rule,55 it was inevitable that at some point the need for finality"
would clash with the validity oriented rhetoric of the courts
57
and the jurisdictional conceptualization would break down.5
" Nuernberger v. State, 359 N.E.2d 412, 415 (N.Y. 1976).
" See, e.g., Bingham v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1977); Single-
ton v. Commonwealth, 208 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. 1948); Ritchie v. Commonwealth, 17
S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1929); See also Hill v. Walker, 180 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Ky. 1944); Brown's
Adm'r v. Gabhart, 23 S.W.2d 551, 552-53 (Ky. 1930); Kentucky Bonding Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 199 S.W. 807, 808-09 (Ky. 1918).
11 See generally Comment, The Contemporaneous Objection Rule: Time for a Re-
Examination, 67 Ky. L.J. 212 (1979).
51 See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 2 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978).
11 The two precursors of Schooley were Crick v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 534
(Ky. 1977), and Holt v. Commonwealth, 525 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1975). In Crick, the
appellant's case had been waived by the juvenile court to the circuit court. He was
thereafter indicted on three felony charges, entered guilty pleas, and was sentenced.
He did not appeal, but he later unsuccessfully filed a RCr 11.42 motion to set aside
the conviction, in which the jurisdictional issue was not raised. Finally, he filed a
second RCr 11.42 motion, alleging that his conviction was void, due to a lack of
jurisdiction in the circuit court as a result of an invalid waiver from juvenile court. On
appeal, the circuit court's denial of the motion was affirmed. The Court held that:
[t]he failure of Crick to litigate in his first RCr 11.42 proceeding effectively
precludes his raising the issue in a second or any subsequent RCr 11.42
motion ....
The record clearly demonstrates the fact that all issues concerning the
validity of the juvenile court waiver could and should have been presented
in Crick's initial RCr 11.42 motion.
550 S.W.2d at 535.
In Holt, the defendant's case was waived to the circuit court by the juvenile court.
He was then indicted for murder and armed robbery. At this point, he successively:
(1) appealed to the circuit court, challenging the validity of the waiver order; (2) sought
to quash the indictment; and (3) sought a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals
to halt the circuit court prosecution. All three of these requests were turned down. He
thereupon entered guilty pleas to a charge of manslaughter and armed robbery and
[Vol. 67
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1. Due Process Analysis in Schooley
After the Schooley court had approached the transfer issue
as one of due process rather than jurisdiction, the only remain-
ing issue was whether the appellant's case merited relief. It was
Schooley's contention that the order transferring his case was
"invalid because it failed to state the reasons for the transfer
with sufficient particularity."5' The court acknowledged the
existence of such a defect."0 Nevertheless, it held "that there
was no denial of due process justifying setting aside his judg-
ment of conviction."'" The purpose of a sufficiently particular
statement of reasons is "to permit meaningful review of the
transfer order by the circuit court or by an appellate court"'
2
on a direct appeal. When, however, the case arises, as did this
one, "on a motion under RCr 11.42, .. .different considera-
tions are applicable."' 3 The court weighed "the interests of the
public in the finality of criminal judgments of long standing""
was sentenced. The following year he unsuccessfully sought relief under RCr 11.42. On
appeal, he asserted that his fourteenth amendment due process rights had been vio-
lated "and that the requirements of KRS 208.170 were circumvented . . . ." 525
S.W.2d at 661. The Court affirmed, since "the complaints here asserted could and
should have been presented. . . by a properly prosecuted appeal;. . . he may not now
be heard any more than if this were a second application for post-conviction relief
which contained complaints that could have been raised in an initial application." Id.
, Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d at 916.
" The court quoted the circuit court's findings, one of which was " 'that public
justice and the best interests' of Schooley required that the case be transferred to
circuit court." Id. at 917. It noted that this finding did not satisfy the requirements of
Hubbs v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Ky. 1974), but warned that "this
finding must not be taken out of context, and it should be considered in light of the
language of the entire order."566 S.W.2d at 917.
,1 556 S.W.2d at 918.
" Id. at 916. "When the validity of a transfer order is raised on a direct appeal, it
would be reasonable to require that the reasons for the transfer be stated explicitly and
that it not be necessary to infer the specific reasons for transfer from the record." Id.
at 917.
'Id.
" Id. The court noted that "[m]ore than eight years have elapsed since Schooley
entered his pleas of guilty in the circuit court and was sentenced. Schooley is now
twenty-five years of age and the juvenile court has consequently lost any power of
disposition over Schooley. . .. When the issue of the validity of a transfer order is
raised on direct appeal, there is a practical possibility that the juvenile defendant can
still receive the benefit of adjudication in juvenile court. No such possibility exists in
this case." Id. at 917-18. The validity of at least part of this argument is now in doubt.
KRS § 208.020 has recently been amended to read, in part, as follows:
(1) The juvenile session of the district court of each county shall have
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against the gravity of the error, which in this case was
"relatively minor,"' 5 and held in favor of finality."
2. Due Process Analysis in Rich
The Supreme Court in Rich also broke with its recent tra-
dition67 and treated the transfer issue as one of due process."
In this case; however, due process analysis did not yield the
same result as in, Schooley, i.e., a waiver of the right to object
to the defect in juvenile proceedings. The Rich Court noted
that "a recidivist conviction can only be obtained if it is shown
that the defendant ha[s] been previously lawfully convicted
of a felony."'" As has been stated in one factually similar case,
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning. . . any person who at the
time of committing a public offense was under the age of eighteen (18) years
1978 Ky. Acts. ch. 350, § 2 (emphasis in original); see also KRS § 208.020 (Supp. 1978).
For details of prior wording of this section, see Lowry v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d
841, 842 (Ky. 1968). See also Miller v. Anderson, 519 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1975).
U 556 S.W.2d at 917. The court noted that "[tihere is no issue with respect to
Schooley's guilt," id. at 918, since he had pleaded guilty. It recognized that a plea of
guilty alone "would not cure a substantial denial of due process in the proceedings in
juvenile court," id., but noted that "the entry of a guilty plea has been a significant
factor in the decision of other courts holding that there was no denial of due process
to a juvenile defendant who seeks to make a collateral attack upon a judgment based
upon a guilty plea following transfer from juvenile court." Id., citing Harris v. Procu-
nier, 498 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974); Smith v. Yeager,
459 F.2d 124, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1972); and Acuna v. Baker, 418 F.2d 639, 640 (10th Cir.
1969).
" It was important to the Court that this was Schooley's second RCr 11.42 motion
and that it was:
clear that Schooley failed to prosecute an appeal from the circuit court's
order overruling the earlier motion under RCr 11.42. As Schooley ha[d] had
an ample opportunity to challenge the validity of the transfer order by direct
appeal or by the earlier motion under RCr 11.42, his challenge to the validity
of the transfer order in the present motion under RCr 11.42 [was] not
timely.
Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d at 918, citing Crick v. Commonwealth, 550
S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1977), and Holt v. Commonwealth, 525 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1965).
,7 See, e.g., Bingham v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1977); Hamil-
ton v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Ky. 1976); Risner v. Commonwealth, 508
S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1974); Hopson v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 792 (Ky. 1973),
all of which spoke of voidness or invalidity of a conviction due to lack of jurisdiction.
U See notes 13-21 and accompanying text supra for details of the Court's analysis.
See also Mayes v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1978); Sharp v. Commonwealth,
559 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1977) (treating similar objections as an issue of due process, but
finding no error; both cases were decided after Rich and Schooley).
" Rich v. Commonwealth, slip op. at 4, quoting Ingram v. Wingo, 320 F. Supp.
1032, 1033 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
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"the unique nature of a recidivist proceeding transforms what
may be only a procedural error in a prior conviction into a
substantive failure of proof."70 Therefore, assuming that Rich's
allegations as to the defects in his prior conviction are accu-
rate, 71 there was only one permissible conclusion: Rich "is
not guilty of the habitual criminal conviction for which he is
serving a sentence of life imprisonment because his [prior]
conviction cannot be used as an offense under the habitual
criminal statute. 7 2 Thus the gravity of the alleged error in
Rich was much greater than that in Schooley, while the inter-
est in finality was less compelling.
73
E. Conclusion
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not order publica-
tion of its Rich opinion. While the opinion may not be cited as
precedent, 74 its analysis confirms the conclusions reached by
the Court of Appeals in Schooley. Any return by the courts to
notions of jurisdiction and automatic nullity and voidness
would not only be conceptually inaccurate, but would reinject
untold confusion into the transfer area.
11 Canary v. Bland, No. 77-3459, slip op. at 13 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 1978) (Merritt,
J., concurring). The view that a recidivist proceeding holds a special place in this area
of juvenile felony convictions was apparently first recognized by the Kentucky Court
in Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Ky. 1976). See Quick, Kentucky
Law Survey - Criminal Procedure, 65 Ky. L.J. 447,447 n.2, (1976), in which Hamilton
was discussed.
1 See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the Court's
directions for treatment of the case on remand.
n Canary v. Bland, slip op. at 9 (Merritt, J., concurring). See In Re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970); Adams v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 561,563-64 (Ky. 1977). See also
Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974); Thompson v. City of Louisville,
362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). It is worthy of note that the Court did not mention a recent
line of its cases which has held that a defendant may waive his objection to a failure
of the Commonwealth to prove an element of the habitual criminal offense by a lack
of a timely objection or motion for acquittal. See Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 564
S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ky. 1977); Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Ky.
1977); Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89, 90-91 (Ky. 1977), discussed in Com-
ment, supra note 56, at 223-224:
nSee notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra which discuss the balancing test
applied in Schooley.
11 See CR 76.28(4)(c), discused at note 9 supra. Sanctions, including the striking
of a brief, may result from violation of this rule. Yocom v. Justice, 569 S.W.2d 678 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977).
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II. PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT-USE OF DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL
SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT
75
Prosecutors have often sought to introduce into evidence
defendant's silence on being accused by police of commission
of a crime. The theory of such admissibility is that silence in
the face of an accusation constitutes an admission of guilt.
Both the Kentucky Supreme Court"8 and the United States
Supreme Court" have held that such action violates a defen-
dant's constitutional rights.78 Yet cases containing this error
have continued to come before Kentucky courts and in many
convictions have been affirmed, either through use of the harm-
less error loophole" created by the Kentucky Supreme Court,"
or because of failure to preserve properly the issue for appellate
review.81
However, these procedural smokescreens may not shield
this form of prosecutorial abuse in the future. 2 Justice Lu-
, Where the defendant actually makes some statement after being advised of his
rights, and then testifies at trial, his pretrial statement may be used to impeach him.
Hockenbury v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1978). In that case, the Court
stated: "[This case is unlike one in which a defendant stands mute at arrest and first
offers an explanation or alibi at trial. It is abundantly clear from the record that
Hockenbury at the time of his arrest was willing to discuss with the officers his wherea-
bouts at the time of the robberies." Id. at 450.
7' Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976).
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
,' For fuller discussion of these two cases, see Quick, Kentucky Law Survey -
Criminal Procedure, 65 Ky. L.J. 447, 459-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Ken-
tucky Law Survey].
11 See Darnell v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590, 593-94 (Ky. 1977); Stiles v.
Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). See also Summitt v. Com-
monwealth, 550 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Ky. 1977).
I The Court held that the error in Niemeyer was of constitutional magnitude, and
commented further that it was "an inexcusable example of abuse by a public prosecu-
tor." 533 S.W.2d at 222. The Court nevertheless affirmed the convictions citing Har-
rington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), and Watkins v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d
245 (Ky. 1971). 533 S.W.2d at 221. See 1976 Kentucky Law Survey, supra note 78, at
459-61. The Kentucky Supreme Court did not have the final say on "harmlessness"
in the Niemeyer case. The United States District Court found that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and granted Niemeyer's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Commonwealth
petitioned for certiorari sub nom. Black v. Niemeyer, No. 77-986, 46 U.S.L.W. 3501
(1978). The Supreme Court of the United States denied the peition, 435 U.S. 932
(1978).
8! See Lynem v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Ky. 1978); Salisbury v.
Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Ky. App. 1977).
12 The Commonwealth has not prevailed in every case. See, e.g., Campbell v.
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kowsky, the first to voice real concern" over the harmless error
loophole created in Niemeyer v. Commonwealth,4 noted that:
Since our decision in 'Niemeyer' we have seen a parade of
cases in which this error has reared its ugly head .... Hav-
ing seen the same error pass in review so many times, I am
compelled to conclude that prosecutors are deliberately disre-
garding the teachings of 'Niemeyer' in the hope of finding
salvation in the harmless error doctrine. In other words, they
are more interested in obtaining a conviction than in obtain-
ing a conviction that will stick."5
Justice Lukowsky felt that the approach taken by the Court
since Niemeyer "encourage[d] the commission of such error,"
concluding that:
The time has come for us to take a more prophylactic ap-
proach. We should exercise our supervisory authority over the
lower courts of Kentucky and hold that whenever this error
is committed it will result in reversal and a new trial. If that
should prove to be insufficient to eliminate this form of
gamesmanship we should assess the costs of appeal and the
new trial against the Commonwealth Attorney."6
Justice Lukowsky is undoubtedly correct that the rule, as
stated and applied in Niemeyer, does little to discourage prose-
cutors willing to deliberately inject such error into the record. 7
On the other hand, Darnell v. Commonwealth," the case which
provoked Justice Lukowsky's dissent, was a classic case of
harmless error and the majority of the Court was undoubtedly
reluctant to reverse, since there was overwhelming evidence of
guilt in this particularly brutal and bizarre crime.8 Chuck Dar-
Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 528, 531-32 (Ky. 1978); Romans v. Commonwealth, 547
S.W.2d 128, 130 (Ky. 1977).
" See Darnell v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590, 596 (Ky. 1977) (Lukowsky, J.,
dissenting).
" 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976).
85 558 S.W.2d at 596 (Lukowsky, J., dissenting). Accord, 1976 Kentucky Law
Survey, supra note 78, at 460-61.
U 558 S.W.2d at 596 (Lukowksy, J., dissenting).
s7 "We provided the tightrope of harmless error and perhaps that was enough to
encourage zealots to walk it." Id.
The Supreme Court of the United States did not reach the harmless error question
in Doyle v. Ohio, since the State did not raise it. 426 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976).
" 558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977).
s "There is an abundance of evidence contained in seven volumes." Darnell v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d at 593.
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nell and Mike Nickel robbed Chuck's grandfather and step-
grandmother of four or five hundred dollars; Chuck killed his
grandfather's wife with a lug-wrench; Mike shot Chuck's
grandfather in the right eye with a pistol.10 They admitted the
crime to Chuck's father. The grandfather "testified positively
that 'Chuckie' and Mike were the only persons [to visit his
house] the night these sordid crimes were committed.""
There were three instances of alleged prosecutorial misuse
of defendants' pretrial silence. First, the arresting officer was
asked on direct examination by the prosecutor whether either
defendant made a statement after being advised of his consti-
tutional rights. He replied in the negative. A defense motion for
a mistrial "was overruled but the jury was given an admoni-
tion." 2 Second, "Mike Nickel was asked on cross-examination
if he had said, after being advised of his rights, 'Me and this
other fellow. . . (nodding to Charles Darnell). . . have noth-
ing to say. We want a lawyer'." 3 A second motion for mistrial
was made and denied. Finally, in rebuttal, the officer was
asked whether Mike had indicated that the defendants would
not make a statement, and answered "Yes, sir.""
The Court concluded that:
the three isolated questions here constitute only harmless
error which does not require reversal ....
... In this case, the prosecutor did not focus on their
silence by repetitive questioning, nor did he mention it in his
closing argument." Secondly, the answer which was obtained
0 The grandfather survived the attack and testified at trial. However, the Court
related the grandfather's wife's wounds as follows:
A pathologist performed an autopsy on Hattie's body. He found multiple
and extensive wounds and lacerations about the head and left side of the
face, and the area above the bridge of her nose. A piece of the right ear was
missing; there were multiple fractures of the cranial bones. There was mas-
sive hemorrhage over the entire surface of the brain. The pathologist also
found there was a gunshot wound in the lower neck. He testified that in his
opinion death was caused by a massive intracranial hemorrhage.
Id. at 592.




', Cf. Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218, 219-21 (Ky. 1976) (in which
the prosecutor committed such further acts).
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was that they desired the services of an attorney before mak-
ing a statement. Thus an inference of guilt was negated by
the explanation of their silence. Finally, the evidence against
Chuck and Mike was overwhelming."
Given a less clear-cut case, the Kentucky Supreme Court
may be willing to abandon its reliance on the harmless error
doctrine. In a case decided less than four months after Darnell,
the Court went out of its way to comment on similar prosecu-
torial misconduct. 7 After noting the United States Supreme
Court's disapproval of "such a tactic"'" and the Common-
wealth's concession of constitutional error, the Court con-
cluded:
We did not reverse the conviction in Niemeyer because
we thought that a word of caution would suffice to curb this
practice; apparently we were wrong. While we have not yet
reached the point where we think it necessary to invoke the
prophylactic rule suggested by our brother Lukowsky.
we must admit our patience is wearing thin."
The message to prosecutors at this point should be clear:
anyone attempting to use a defendant's pretrial silence as a
technique of impeachment does so at the genuine risk of rever-
sal. The prosecutor faces not only the risk of an effective rever-
sal by a federal court in collateral proceedings,110 but also the
increasing risk of reversal by Kentucky courts as well.101
" Darnell v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d at 593-94. The appellants raised several
other issues, each of which was held by the Court not to require reversal. The sentences
were vacated, however, and remanded for resentencing in compliance with KRS §
532.050 (Supp. 1978) and Brewer v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1977).
11 Campbell v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1978). The Court noted:
"Although we do not choose to rely upon it as an alternative ground for reversal of
[the] conviction, inasmuch as it was not objected to below, we are compelled in the
exercise of our supervisory function to make mention of yet another instance of prose-
cutorial abuse." Id. at 531.
's Id. at 532.
"Id. Cf. Stiles v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 645, 646-47 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(questioning of defendant concerning his failure to give a statement "innocuous in
comparison with the example in Niemeyer.").
IN See, e.g., Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904
(1976). But cf. Hayton v. Egeler, 555 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973
(1977) (attempt to impeach alibi witness by asking about defendant's post-arrest si-
lence held to be harmless error).
M" In two survey period cases not involving the Niemeyer-Doyle error, convictions
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
III. REQUIRED PRESENTENCE PROCEDURES
A. Failure to Follow Presentencing Requirements
In 1974, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted KRS §
532.050, which sets forth a detailed list of presentence proce-
dures for felony cases.' 2 In Brewer v. Commonwealth' 3 the
were reversed due to prosecutor misconduct. See Campbell v. Commonwealth, 564
S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1978) and Bowler v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1977).
Bowler, in which the defendant had been convicted of the murder of his wife,
involved two examples of abuse - "deliberately inject[ing] into the case, via a ques-
tion, material prejudicial to the rights of the defendant without some reasonable basis
to believe there will be an affirmative answer," id. at 171 (asking the defendant's
stepdaughter whether he had ever molested her); and "improper argument in the
presence of the jury after the cases was submitted to them - accusing the defense of
deliberately concealing evidence." Id.
In Campbell, the prosecutor had questioned a witness about threats allegedly
made against him, implying that the defendant had made them. The Court reversed
the conviction, noting that "[lt is a rule of longstanding in this jurisdiction that
evidence that a witness has been threatened or otherwise influenced in an attempt to
suppress his testimony is admissible in a criminal prosecution only where the threat
was made by, or on behalf of the accused." 564 S.W.2d at 531. In this case, there was
no basis for believing that the defendant had made the threat or caused it to be made.
Therefore, the prosecutor's action was "an inexcusable breach of his duty as an officer
of this court to prosecute with an eye towards fairness as well as with an eye towards
winning." Id. at 532.
102 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 406, § 277. The statute provides:
(1) No court shall impose sentence for conviction of a felony, other
than a capital offense, without first ordering a presentence investigation
after conviction and giving due consideration to a written report of such
investigation.
(2) The report shall be prepared and presented by a probation officer
and shall include an analysis of the defendant's history of delinquency or
criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and back-
ground, economic status, education, occupation, personal habits, and any
other matters that the court directs to be included.
(3) Before imposing sentence for a felony conviction, the court may
order the defendant to submit to psychiatric observation and examination
for a period not exceeding sixty days. The defendant may be remanded for
this purpose to any available clinic or mental hospital or the court may
appoint a qualified psychiatrist to make the examination.
(4) Before imposing sentence, the court shall advise the defendant or
his counsel of the factual contents and conclusions of any presentence inves-
tigation or psychiatric examinations and afford a fair opportunity and a
reasonable period of time, if the defendant so requests, to controvert them.
The sources of confidential information need not, however, be disclosed.
KRS § 532.050. The words "after conviction" in subsection (1) were added to the
statute in 1976. See 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 183, § 5.
1- 550 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1977).
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Court held that the requirements of KRS § 532.050(1) and (4)
are "mandatory and [do] not afford a trial judge the privilege
or discretion of determining whether the report will be re-
quested, obtained, or considered . . . . [T]hey are in fact a
prerequisite to the entry of a valid judgment." "' Thus, in each
case of conviction for a non-capital 05 felony offense, the court
must order a presentence investigation,"' consider a written
report of the investigation," 7 report its contents and conclu-
sions to the defendant or his attorney,'"' and, on request, allow
an opportunity to challenge the report.1"' Finally, "in view of
the mandatory character of this requirement, the record of the
proceeding should clearly disclose the fact that the trial court
has fully complied with KRS § 532.050. . .. "I"
Several cases decided during the survey period involved a
failure to carry out these mandatory procedures.1 The Court
consistently vacated the judgments in these cases and re-
manded them for resentencing. In sum, unless the trial court
complies with the statutory presentencing requirements and
makes a clear record of its compliance, resentencing will be
necessary.
B. Timeliness of the Presentence Report Upon Resentencing
In Doolan v. Commonwealth, 112 the trial court twice failed
I" Id. at 476. This holding obviates the necessity of examining whether the statute
is an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to invade the rule-making authority
of the Court. See Ky. CONST. §§ 109, 27, 28. Cf. Commonwealth v. Schumacher, 566
S.W.2d 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a procedural statute not binding on the
court).
IN See KRS § 532.075 (Supp. 1978) for special rules concerning review of a death
sentence.
I" The contents of the report are outlined in KRS § 532.050(2). See note 102, supra
for the text of the statute.
I" KRS § 532.050(1).
IN KRS § 532.050(4).
'"Id.
" Brewer v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d at 476-77.
"' See, e.g., Carter v. Commonwealth, No. SC-571-MR (Ky. May 23,1978) (mem.
per curiam); Pridemore v. Commonwealth, No. SC-331-MR (Ky. May 23, 1978) (mem.
per curiam); Nickell v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1978); Sears v. Common-
wealth, 561 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1978) (erroneously dated 1979 in the reporter); England
v. Commonwealth, No. SC-332-MR (Ky. Dec. 9, 1977) (mem. per curiam); Darnell v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977).
112 566 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1978).
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to comply with the mandate of Brewer and KRS § 532.050. On
Doolan's first appeal from three robbery convictions, the Court
remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because
the court had failed to advise him "of the factual contents and
conclusions of the presentence investigation so that he might
have an opportunity to controvert them as provided by KRS §
532.050(4)."1l3 On remand, the trial court resentenced him, and
the defendant prosecuted a second appeal, "contend[ing] that
the trial court again failed to follow the directives of this court
and the relevant portions of the presentencing statute.11' He
alleged two errors: first, that the trial court relied on the pre-
sentencing report which had been prepared approximately
sixteen months earlier for the first sentencing, and declined to
order an updated report; and second, though the appellant now
discovered what he contended to be erroneous information in
the report, that "[t]he trial court did not deem it necessary
to postpone sentencing until the veracity of the appellant's
claims could be fairly and accurately authenticated. 1 15 The
Court again reversed the judgment and remanded for resen-
tencing, stating:
A careful examination of the statute and the applicable
case law leads to the inescapable conclusion that the trial
court erred in not securing a current presentencing report and
by not affording the appellant a fair opportunity to contradict
the information contained therein . . . .It may be that a
revised presentencing report would have elicited no new in-
formation which would have altered the appellant's sentence.
On the other hand, a revised report may have presented an
entirely different factual structure.
It may also be that the appellant will be unable to sub-
stantiate his contention that the prior criminal offenses listed
in the report are not properly attributable to him. Neverthe-
less, the statute provides for a presentencing report and af-
fords the appellant the right to controvert any information
contained therein. To affirm the judgment of the trial court
under these facts would be to disparage the logical intent and
purpose of the statute."'
HI Doolan v. Commonwealth, No. 76-439, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Mar. 11, 1977) (mem.
per curiam).
"I Doolan v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 413, 413 (Ky. 1978).
Id. at 414.
" Id. at 414-15.
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C. Waiver of Presentence Procedures
1. May They Be Waived?
Two cases decided during the survey period held that a
defendant may waive the presentence procedures mandated by
KRS § 532.050 and Brewer v. Commonwealth,117 since "[t]he
requirements of KRS § 532.050 were established primarily for
the benefit of the accused, and he should be allowed to forego
these procedures if he so chooses." '18
Other jurisdictions with mandatory presentence require-
ments similar to those of KRS § 532.050 are split on the issue
of waiver of such procedures. In Illinois, for example, the stat-
ute' expressly provides "that a defendant may waive his
statutory right to a written presentence report." ' On the other
hand, Michigan, 2 ' New York, 122 and Oregon '1 courts have all
held that a defendant cannot waive this procedure.12' These
courts generally view the statutory purpose much more broadly
than the Kentucky courts. As one New York court has stated:
[t]he pre-sentence report requirement is designed not
merely to make the sentence more meaningful for the of-
fender but also to bring before the court factors that may call
for treatment in the community. The pre-sentence report re-
quirement is designed for the criminal justice process, for the
correctional process and society, rather than for the conveni-
ence of the court, the prosecutor and the defendant.12
Nevertheless the mere existence of an independent societal
interest is not itself dispositive 2 1 While "a defendant should
be powerless to waive any rights that society has in the sentenc-
,, Alcom v. Commonwealth, 557 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. 1977); Risinger v. Common-
wealth, 556 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
,S Alcorn v. Commonwealth, 557 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Ky. 1977).
"' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973).
" People v. Meyers, 371 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), citing People v.
Barto, 344 N.E.2d 433, 436 (111. 1976).
"I People v. Brown, 224 N.W.2d 38 (Mich. 1974).
'- People v. Bentley, 359 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1974).
'" State v. Biles, 579 P.2d 259 (Ore. Ct. App. 1978).
See also State v. Lee, 381 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
225 People v. Bentley, 359 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1974) (citation
omitted). See also Thomas v. State, 356 So.2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1978).
2 People v. Brown, 224 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Mich. 1974) (Kavanagh, C.J. concurring).
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ing process,""12 those societal rights are protected in other ways,
since "both the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney are in
a position to assure that a defendant's waiver of the presen-
tence report does not deprive the public of its right to have
criminals properly punished.""1 8 Therefore, as long as the
courts are careful to safeguard the interests of society, waiver
should be permitted as an instrument of economy.
2. Standard for Valid Waiver
Although waiver of presentence procedures is clearly per-
missible in Kentucky, the courts have not yet decided whether
such a waiver must be made in an intelligent, understanding,
and voluntary manner. 2 ' The issue has been raised before the
Kentucky Supreme Court, but since the Court felt "that the
waiver by appellant was in fact understandingly made, [it]
deem[ed] it unnecessary to pass on this question." ' In Illi-
nois, any such waiver must be voluntary, understanding, and
intelligent 3' even though waiver is expressly permitted by stat-
ute.132 This standard has support in other jurisdictions as
well.lrs
Such a standard is certainly proper for Kentucky. Not only
does the requirement further the purpose of KRS § 532.050, it
also gives all parties concerned - the judge, prosecutor, de-
fense counsel, and defendant - the opportunity to reflect on
the propriety of the waiver. A voluntariness requirement for a
valid waiver is one method of ensuring that the policy behind
presentence procedure is not sacrificed for the sake of expe-
diency alone.
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY - ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
Prior to enactment of KRS § 505.030,13 "it [was] well
127 Id.
12 Id.
I" See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
11 Alcom v. Commonwealth, 557 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Ky. 1977).
M People v. Barto, 344 N.E.2d 433, 436 (111. 1976); People v. Meyers, 371 N.E.2d
1130, 1134 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977).
11 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973).
133 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 224 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Mich. 1974) (Kavanagh, C.J.,
concurring).
13 This section was part of the Kentucky Penal Code. 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406 § 48.
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settled in this state that jeopardy does not attach until a jury
has been sworn. ' 135 KRS § 505.030 provides, however, that
jeopardy does not attach until the first witness is sworn.136 The
issue of the constitutionality of such a change was before both
the Kentucky '37 and United States ' Supreme Courts during
the survey year. The Courts reached contrary results.
In Graham v. Commonwealth,"' the appellant was con-
victed of manslaughter in his second trial. The first trial had
resulted in a mistrial, when "after the jury was selected and
sworn, but before the first witness was sworn, the appellant
through counsel stated that he had not been arraigned."'' 4' The
Commonwealth, rather than the defendant, moved for and was
granted a mistrial. After proper arraignment a new trial was
called. Graham pleaded double jeopardy. The plea was denied
and Graham was found guilty by the jury.
On appeal, Graham argued that by being forced to stand
trial a second time, when a jury had been sworn in the first,
he had been subjected to double jeopardy."' The Common-
wealth responded that since the first trial ended before the first
witness had been sworn, jeopardy had not attached at the first
trial.' The appellant's reply was that "the change effected by
[KRS § 505.030(4)] violates a mandate of the Constitution of
the United States."'
The conviction was affirmed and the statute held to be
constitutional. The rule on point of attachment urged by appel-
lant was, the Court conceded, applicable to federal courts, but
"[t]he Supreme Court has neither in Serfass14 nor in any
' Allen v. Walter, 534 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Ky. 1976). See Baker v. Commonwealth,
132 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1939).
,m KRS § 505.030(4). "This definition of the attachment of jeopardy is identical
to that contained in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code . . . .The
Institute could find no compelling reason to perpetuate the distinction between jury
and bench trial as to the point at which jeopardy should be deemed to attach."
Graham v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. 1978).
I" Graham v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1978).
lu Crist v. Bretz, 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978).
' 562 S.W.2d 625 (Ky.- 1978).
,, Id. at 626.
.. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV.
,, See KRS § 505.030(4).
562 S.W.2d at 626.
' Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
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other case of which we have knowledge held that the federal
rules for the determination of the attachment of jeopardy are
constitutionally obligatory on the states." 4 ' In the Court's
opinion "L]eopardy attaches when a defendant is placed on
trial before the trier of the facts." 4' In the Court's opinion,
since it is constitutionally permissible for the point of attach-
ment in bench trials to be at the point where the first witness
is sworn, the same point should govern in jury trials. The prac-
tice of differentiating between two points of attachment by
"the number of triers of fact" '147 was merely "a historical anach-
ronism."" 8
In Crist v. Bretz,"' the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the rule "that jeopardy attaches when the jury
is empaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy."110 Thus, the holding in
Graham is no longer authoritative and KRS § 505.030(4), to the
extent it provides otherwise, is unconstitutional. "[Tihe rule
that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn [is not] simply
an arbitrary exercise of line-drawing." ' Rather:
[i]t is a rule that both reflects and protects the defendant's
interest in retaining a chosen jury. We cannot hold that this
rule, so grounded, is only at the periphery of double jeopardy
concerns. Those concerns-the finality of judgments, the
minimization of harassing exposure to the harrowing experi-
ence of a criminal trial, and the valued right to continue with
the chosen jury - have combined to produce the federal law
that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is em-
paneled and sworn.'5 2
"1 562 S.W.2d at 627. The Court noted that its holding conflicted with that in
Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976), which at the time Graham was decided
was before the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari. The Court refused, however, to
accept the conclusions reached by the federal Court of Appeals in Crist.
"1 562 S.W.2d at 627.
147 Id.
148 Id.
"' 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978) (Stewart, J.).
1"0 Id. at 2162.
' Id. at 2161.
,52 Id. at 2162. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented. In a separate opinion, the Chief Justice warned that "[w]e should be cautious
about constitutionalizing every procedural device found useful in federal courts,
thereby foreclosing the States from experimentation with different approaches which
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However, the holding in Crist v. Bretz would not necessar-
ily mandate a different result in Graham. Double jeopardy
precluding retrial of a defendant requires not only an attach-
ment of jeopardy in the first trial, but also requires that the
"former prosecution [be] improperly terminated.'"5 3 Thus
"[ihe attachment of jeopardy merely begins the inquiry as to
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
proscribes a retrial."'54 Under decisions of both the United
States'55 and Kentucky155 Supreme Courts, "[tiermination is
not improper if the defendant seeks, consents, or otherwise
waives the right to object to the mistrial."'57 Neither is termina-
tion improper if defendant causes the mistrial. While Graham
did not himself make the actual motion for a mistrial,he did
not voice any objections;'58 it is possible that counsel in
Graham deliberately failed to raise the lack of arraignment
until the jury was sworn in an attempt to cause jeopardy to
attach. Thus, even under Crist v. Bretz, the result in Graham
probably would remain the same.
are equally compatible with constitutional principles." Id. at 2163 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). Justice Powell's opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist
joined, had much of the flavor of the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion in Graham.
For example, it referred to the rule as the "product of historical accident." Id. at 2163
(Powell, J., dissenting).
"3 KRS § 505.030(4).
15 Commonwealth v. Lewis, 548 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Ky. 1977), citing Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973).
"3 See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977); United States v. Join, 400
U.S. 470 (1971).
"'See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 548 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1977).
8,  KENTucKY PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 541. See KRS § 505.030(4)(a).
"3 In addition, the failure to raise the lack of an arraignment until after the jury
was sworn may have been intentional, i.e., a deliberate attempt to expose the defen-
dant to jeopardy. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 548 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1977).
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